Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical model to test whether the World Bank alters the distribution of its lending to cater to U.S. interests. We use country-level panel data to examine the geographic distribution of World Bank lending from 1968 to 1992. After controlling for country characteristics that are expected to influence the distribution of lending in a manner consistent with the World Bank's apolitical charter and stated allocation mechanisms, we introduce variables reflecting U.S. interests and the bargaining strengths of the two parties. Estimation results reveal a significant U.S. influence which varies across presidential administrations.
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"quality" -all of which depend on the independence of the multilateral aid institution. Even from the donor point of view, short run advantages that may accrue from controlling a multilateral aid agency should be balance against the long run reduced usefulness of the agency as its credibility is undermined.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II surveys the literature on aid allocation and World Bank/U.S. relations. Section III presents a model of bargaining between an aid agency and its major donor. Section IV describes the data and variables used. Section V presents estimation results. Section VI concludes.
II. Aid Allocation and World Bank/U.S. Relations
This paper bridges a gap between two largely separate branches of the foreign aid literature, one on the allocation of aid and the other on the influence of donors over multilateral aid agencies. The aid allocation literature is primarily empirical, drawing on data collected by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee and, in some cases, individual donor agencies. The literature on donor influence is largely based on institutional analysis with supporting case studies.
The empirical aid allocation literature spans some thirty years and explores a variety of questions. One major thread of the literature examines donor allocation behavior to uncover the motives for giving aid. Another approach takes the recipient perspective and focuses on allocation outcomes in terms of 2 donor concentration and aid intensity. This work on aid allocation is important for studies of the 3 impact of aid on growth; it provides insight into how the criteria for allocation influence the effectiveness Alesina and Weder (1999) , Boone (1996) , Burnside and Dollar (2000) , Mosley (1987) . 4 OECD DAC (various), Mosley (1985) 5 Those dealing with multilateral aid include Cline and Sargen (1975) , Frey and Schneider 6 (1986), Bowles (1989) , Weck-Hannemann and Schneider (1991) , Grilli and Riess (1992) , Valverde (1999) , and Alesina and Dollar (2000) . Clark (1991 Clark ( , 1992 examines the distribution of U.S. bilateral aid by recipient income only 7 making use of Lorenz curves and a summary index. McGillivray (1989) , Rao (1994 Rao ( , 1997 , and White (1992) examine summary indices of donor performance. Poe (1991) provides a useful comparison of several articles in this literature. Alesina and Dollar (2000) , Ball and Johnson (1996) , Eggleston (1987) , McKinlay and Little 9 (1977, 1979) , Meernik, Krueger and Poe (1998) Poe (1990) and Blanton (1994) survey this debate. 10 3 of aid; and it assists in addressing endogeneity problems in aid and growth regressions. Aid allocation 4 data are also used to determine the "quality" of aid and the degree to which donors achieve target levels of funding. Much of the literature focuses on bilateral aid but some studies cover multilateral 5 organizations. Most studies estimate allocation equations; a few take different approaches. 6 7 A number of studies include analysis of U.S. bilateral aid. Although the U.S. was the largest donor 8 until 1989, a substantial literature argues that U.S. aid allocation is not conducive to promoting development (e.g., McGillivray 1989) and is characterized by a bias toward middle income countries (Clark 1992) . Numerous studies find U.S. bilateral aid allocation to be motivated primarily by geopolitics (especially during the Cold War era) and secondarily by commercial and, to a lesser extent, humanitarian interests. There is an ongoing debate over the influence of countries' human rights 9 records on U.S. bilateral aid, particularly comparing allocation patterns across different presidential administrations. Some authors find either little influence or a bias toward human rights abusers 10 (Schoultz 1981; Carleton and Stohl 1987; McCormick and Mitchell 1988) while others find a positive relationship between aid levels and a record of respecting human rights (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Pasquarello 1988; Hofrenning 1990; Poe 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1993; Blanton 1994; Valverde 1999) . Studies of U.S. food aid reveal that these programs serve a variety of objectives including humanitarian, geopolitical and surplus disposal (Eggleston 1987; Shapouri and Missiaen 1990; Ball and Johnson 1996) . Cold War geopolitics have been an important factor in U.S. aid allocations and, consequently, as areas of confrontation shifted and eventually subsided, U.S. aid allocations have changed (Ball and Johnson 1996; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998) . Changes in U.S. administrations have also shifted U.S. foreign aid policies and allocation patterns (Eggleston 1987; Poe 1991 (Lagae 1990) . Some authors effectively exclude these two recipients in their analysis (Hofrenning 1990; Alesina and Dollar 2000?) .
A largely separate and non-econometric literature has examined the influence of member states on the policies and practices of multilateral development banks. Gwin's (1997) Bank's 50 anniversary retrospective focuses on U.S. influence and draws on much of the preceding th literature on World Bank governance. Using numerous case studies, Gwin argues that the U.S. has had substantial influence. In several cases, the World Bank appears to have "bent the rules" in favor of the U.S. position; there are even a few documented instances of World Bank management violating the institution's charter to retain U.S. support (e.g., McNamara's famous letter to the U.S. Congress pledging not to lend to Vietnam). Gwin's position is that U.S. presidential administrations have sufficient tools to direct World Bank policy and lending (killing measures before they reach a vote, conditioning funding on policy reform, lobbying other members to support the U.S. position, etc.) but that significant effort is required. She argues that the U.S. Congress has less influence because its instruments are too blunt. In a narrow sense, this literature finds U.S. influence positive in some cases (e.g., promoting accountability through oversight and the creation of the Operations Evaluation Department) and less so in others (denying aid to certain regimes in Latin America and elsewhere). In a larger sense, however, U.S. influence -or the appearance of influence -has tended to undermine the credibility of the World Bank as a independent multilateral organization.
In contrast, the World Bank has repeatedly argued that it remains true to its charter and multilateral character. In each episode identified by Gwin and others, the World Bank has justified its actions as consistent with the mandate stated in its charter, pointing to reasons for its actions other than donor pressure. For example, the suspension of aid to Chile under Ienda was justified on the basis of Chile's nationalization of foreign assets without adequate compensation. For various other countries that have antagonized the United States, the World Bank has denied aid on the basis of unsound economic policies.
There is a largely unexplored area of overlap between these literatures: to what extent does the allocation of funds by multilateral aid agencies reflect the narrow interests of their major donors? The most important work on this topic is by Frey and Schneider (1986) who explore some aspects of the relationship between the World Bank and its major donors (United Kingdom, France, United States, West Germany, Japan, Italy, and the Benelux). They test four competing models of World Bank lending activity concluding that the "politico-economic" model in which donor interests matter performs best. Specifically, "colonies and dominations" enter positively and significantly for the UK, France and the U.S. while share of exports is positive and significant for the UK, France, the U.S. and the Benelux. Weck-Hannemann and Schneider (1991) follows a similar approach, comparing results for results.
This function is consistent with very straightforward assumptions about donor costs and 13 benefits, e.g., a constant marginal cost of providing funds and a standard, downward sloping, linear marginal benefit curve. Consider, for example, the x-dimension. If the marginal benefit equals marginal cost at a positive value of spending, that positive value is x . The quadratic loss term !(x!x ) also I I 2 follows from linear marginal benefits and costs for the same reason that a deadweight loss increases with the square of the distance from the market equilibrium quantity in a standard linear supply and demand model. The exact functional form assumed for f arises when (i) the marginal cost of x is constant and equal to the marginal cost of y and (ii) the marginal benefit curve for x is parallel to and below the marginal benefit curve for y.
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the World Bank, other UN agencies, and DAC bilateral aid.
III. A Model of Agency-Donor Interaction
This section presents a theoretical model to analyze the distribution of aid by a multilateral agency when (i) the agency relies on funding from an influential donor and (ii) the agency and donor have different preferences over benefit distribution. The model characterizes an agency that is dependent on a donor for funding but can decide independently how to allocate funds between aid recipients. For simplicity, we consider the case of two recipients.
Denote:
x Aid allocated recipient x. y Aid allocated to recipient y. B=x+y Budget. s=y/B Budget share to recipient y. á0 [0, 1] Bargaining parameter measuring the donor bargaining position. á=0 indicates the agency has all the bargaining power (i.e., the bargaining outcome is the point in the core favored by the agency (point A)). á=1 indicates the donor has all the bargaining power (i.e., the bargaining outcome is the point in the core favored by the donor (point D)).
Assumptions:
A1 Donor Preferences. 
Policy Outcomes
We present the model's solution as several propositions followed by a graphical illustration. These propositions explain how policy outcomes depend on whether or not bargaining occurs, the relative bargaining power of the agency and donor if bargaining does occur, and donor preferences. Appendix A proves each proposition.
P1 Without bargaining, the donor does not influence allocation.
Without bargaining, only the total budget, not the share of the budget going each recipient, will be influenced by donor preferences. The outcome will allocate the budget evenly between recipients: B=x +y , s=½.
I I P2 With bargaining, the donor does influence allocation.
With bargaining, the relative shares of aid going to recipients, not just the total aid budget, will be influenced by donor preferences: B>x +y , s>½. The shares of aid going to different recipients at the bargaining outcome depend on donor preferences. If the donor favors increasing the share to recipient y (an increase in s =y /(x +y ), the value of s at the I I I I bargaining outcome will increase: .
In Figure 1 , first consider the non-bargaining case. Faced with any fixed budget line, the agency allocates aid evenly as represented by the 45 degree line (s=½). This follows from the symmetry of the agency's indifference curves. Given an agency strategy of an allocation along this 45 degree line, the donor maximizes f by selecting the budget line running through its ideal point. Thus, in the absence of bargaining, the outcome is the simple Nash equilibrium, which allocates aid equally between the two recipients. The donor has no influence on aid allocation.
If the agency and donor do bargain, the outcome will be in the core where recipient x will receive less than will recipient y. An increase in the donor's relative bargaining power (á) will move policy along the core in the direction of greater f (i.e., away from f and toward f(I)), lower g (i.e., away from N g and toward g ), and higher s. Finally, if the donor's ideal point shifted so that s increases
(decreases), the core shifts so that s increases (decreases). 
Applying the Model
The empirically relevant predictions can be summarized as s=s(á, s ) where Ms/Má>0 and Ms/Ms >0.
I I
We test these by including proxies for bargaining power and for donor preferences. Because agency s , â , Z , and å are scalars, X is (1 x n), â is (n x 1), Y is (1 x m), and â and â are (m x 15 i,t 0 t t i,t 1 i,t 2 3 1).
1968 data are missing for multilateral institutions presumably because of a change-over from 16 calendar to fiscal years. We use the average of 1967 and 1969. 8 preferences are symmetric only when recipient countries are equivalent in terms of need, absorptive capacity, and other official criteria, we also condition on variables reflecting these attributes. We estimate equations of the following basic form:
i,t 0 i,t 1 i,t 2 t i,t 3 i,t X represents variables that produce asymmetric agency preferences over allocation, including need, absorptive capacity, and other official criteria. Y presents measures of donor interests that influence the donor's ideal point on dimension i, including commercial, strategic and historical ties. Z measures the donor's bargaining position relative to the agency including donor support for multilateralism and the agency's dependency on funds (i.e., IDA replenishment years). With the variables appropriately 15 defined (higher Y indicating greater donor interest in a recipient and higher Z indicating greater donor bargaining power), the model predicts that â =0 and â =0 if there is no bargaining (i.e., no donor 2 3 influence) while â >0 and â >0 in the case of bargaining (i.e., the presence of donor influence).
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IV. Data
This section explains the data used in this paper which are drawn from the OECD DAC's database, the World Bank's WDI 2000, the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, the Penn World Tables, a database on UN voting, and Poole and Rosenthal's W-NOMINATE database.
We are currently broadening our set of variables to include more country descriptors (from the WDI) to control for the apolitical allocation of aid and more measures of U.S. interests and relative bargaining power. These data should allow us to make better use of the panel nature of the data set and to refine our understanding of U.S. influence. The current variables used are: WB_SHARE World Bank lending to country i in year t / total World Bank lending in year t; lending measured as "Total Official Gross." 16 POPSHARE Population of country i in year t / total pop. in all recipient countries in year t POP_GROW Annual growth rate of population in country i between year t-1 and t GDPPCAP GDP per capita in country i in year t GDPPGROW Annual growth rate of GDP per capita in country i between years t-1 and t OPEN (Imports+Exports)/GDP US_SHARE U.S. bilateral aid to country i in year t / total US bilateral aid in year t; aid measured as "Total Official Gross." SD_SHARE "Small donor" bilateral aid to country i in year t / total small donor bilateral aid in year t; 1966 data are missing for Sweden and the Netherlands presumably because of a change-over 17 from calendar to fiscal years. We use the average of 1965 and 1967.
Derived from OECD disbursement data for the U.S. as "Total Resources Net" ! "Total
18
Official Net" when this figure is positive.
We could, alternatively, use a quadratic specification. Given the group of countries examined, 19 these negative flows generally indicate money returning to the U.S. from past lending or investments rather than foreign purchases of American assets.
Derived from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF DOTS) available from the ICPSR 20 website. Gartzke et al. (1999) . 21 One can use either GDP or GNP net of aid. We exclude aid to Israel and, after 1978, to Egypt.
The aid allocation literature is characterized by relatively weak and often conflicting empirical results. The primary reason for this is the complexity and variability of aid allocation decisions. For example, GDP per capita, the most obvious measure of recipient need, also reflects the recipient's potential as a trading partner and is often correlated with a recipient country's absorptive capacity (i.e., a project is more likely to succeed in a more advance country). In addition, the donor may vary the 22 terms (grant versus loan) rather than quantity of aid in response to recipient income level. As a result, 23 grant-adjusted aid data put together by Chang et al. (1998) and used in Burnside and Dollar (2000) .
See, for example, Stokke (1989) , McGillivray (1989) , Rodrik (1995) and Rao (1997) . 24 However, Schreader, Hook and Taylor (1998) find that Swedish bilateral aid allocation became more ideologically and trade driven in the 1980's while Morrison (2000) argues that Canadian aid policies increasingly resemble those of the G-7 rather than the Scandinavians.
Aggregating these small donors minimizes problems which might be caused by the limited 25 geographic spread of an individual small donor's aid program (see Hoadley (1980) ).
Data limitations prevent examination of Kennedy and Clinton. Proxies for donor interests run into similar difficulties. Bilateral aid seems a natural proxy for donor interests (conditional on other factors influencing aid allocation). However, bilateral and multilateral aid may be substitutes or complements. Major donors use multilateral institutions to leverage their own money but also to pursue objectives and initiatives not well suited to direct bilateral action, for example supporting a government they do not officially recognize or promoting politically contentious policies.
In this paper, we explore a number of possible approaches to dealing with the above problems. While we do include country indicators such has population, income, growth, openness, etc., we also include the share of "small donor" aid going to the recipient country. Numerous studies have found that these donors (Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) allocate their aid in a more humanitarian manner than large donors such as the United States, Japan, France and the U.K. Thus, 24 the share of small donor aid may serve as an effective summary of recipient country need and the perceived effectiveness of aid in the recipient country. To address the mercurial role of donor interest 25 proxy variables, we examine each U.S. presidential administration separately.
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V. Estimation Results
We have not yet finalized our database and hence have only preliminary results. Some sample selection issues also remain. With these major caveats, some estimation results are given below. Table 1 presents simple OLS estimates based on the full sample with no attempt to account for the panel nature of the data. The coefficients on the control variables (POPSHARE, POP_GROW, OPEN, GDPPCAP, GDPPGROW, and SD_SHARE) are typical of estimates for these variables in other specifications and samples. The estimated coefficient for POPSHARE is positive and significant both statistically and in terms of magnitude indicating that country size is a major determinant World Bank funding levels. Population growth also enters positively and significantly while less aid flows to countries that are more open (conditional on a given percentage of U.S. bilateral aid and U.S. commercial financial flows). The positive and significant coefficient on per capita GDP indicates that wealthier countries within this group of potential aid recipients receive more World Bank loans.
We continue to include other measures of recipient need/policy effectiveness because these 27 donors' behavior may change over time or may not reflect certain important dimensions. Specifically, small donors are likely to be biased against large recipients since meaningful involvement in large recipient countries would limit these donors' ability to mount viable aid programs in other countries. This limitation is reflected in the continued importance of the POPSHARE variable especially as China becomes a more significant factor in later years.
A Hausman specification test for correlation between intercepts and the independent variables 28 rejects the Random Effects model in favor of the Fixed Effects model in all relevant specifications and samples.
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Growth also enters positively. The single strongest variable is the share of small donor aid.
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The U.S. interest variables all enter positively and significantly in this simple aggregate estimation. The share of U.S. bilateral aid and the share of net positive U.S. commercial financial flows going to a recipient country have a very strong link to the share of World Bank lending to the country. For countries where the net commercial financial flow is negative (i.e., from the country to the U.S.), the effect is still positive but differs by an order of magnitude. Finally, countries which vote like the U.S. does in the UN receive a greater share of World Bank lending. Tables 2 and 3 examine the "between" and "within" dimensions of the panel. Table 2 presents an estimation based only on country means, eliminating the time series aspect of the data and reducing the sample to 156 observations. US_SHARE and TAU_US (i.e., bilateral aid share and UN voting similarity) are not significant but net positive U.S. commercial financial flows maintain a significant, positive link to a country's average share of World Bank lending across the period. Table 3 presents estimation results from a fixed effects model which allows a separate intercept term for each country (intercepts not reported) and hence retains only time series variation. The donor interest variables are all insignificant except for US_SHARE which is positive and marginally significant (90% confidence level) but roughly an order of magnitude smaller than in the estimation without fixed effects .
28 Table 4 explores an alternate measure of U.S. interests, using the "relative allocation" variable proposed by Wittkopf (1973) . This variable measures the percentage deviation of a country's U.S. bilateral aid share from the country's share in aggregate bilateral aid. Thus, positive values reflect countries favored by U.S. aid. The estimated coefficient on relative allocation is negative and marginally significant while the U.S. commercial variable coefficients are similar to estimates in Table 1 . The relative allocation variable (and a related variable using only the small donors as the comparison group) yields similar, generally insignificant results in other equation specifications.
A perhaps more interesting approach is to allow for differences across U.S. administrations with their shifting perceptions of U.S. interests and changing strategies toward meeting these ends. Tables 5 through 10 examine the Johnson through Bush (Senior) administrations. We examine the first and second Reagan administrations separately because of the administration's radical re-evaluation of the World Bank prompted by the lingering debt crisis. Table 5 examines the Johnson Administration. Missing data until 1968 and the on-going decolonization process limit the sample to 78 observations. The bulk of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the small donor share (SD_SHARE). Of the U.S. interest variables, only the UN voting record (TAU_US) is marginally significant (90 % confidence level). Table 6 examines the Nixon administration from 1969 to 1976, a much richer data set (608 observations). US_SHARE and USCP_SH (the share of net positive U.S. commercial financial flows) are highly significant. TAU_US is again marginally significant (90 % confidence level). Interestingly, there is no impact on World Bank lending for countries/years with negative net U.S. commercial financial flows (USCN_SH) although this may reflect the relatively few countries in this situation (check number). Table 7 examines the Carter Administration from 1977 to 1980 (314 observations). US_SHARE and USCP_SH are again positive and significant. USCN_SH is also positive and significant although the effect is an order of magnitude smaller than for countries/years with positive flows. UN voting (TAU_US) no longer has any relation to World Bank lending shares. Table 8 presents results for the first Reagan Administration from 1981 to 1984 (328 observations). US_SHARE and USCP_SH continue positive and significant but the US_SHARE becomes more important quantitatively especially as compared to the small donor share (SD_SHARE). USCN_SH is actually negative and significant, suggesting that US commercial lending and multilateral lending are substitutes in countries experiencing an American exodus and complements in countries garnering significant new American investments. UN voting again has no discernable link with World Bank lending. Table 9 presents results for the second Reagan Administration from 1985 to 1988 (334 observations). The estimation results confirm a significant change in the relationship between the U.S. and the World Bank. The importance of US_SHARE is back in line with that of SD_SHARE while positive and negative U.S. commercial finance flows have a similar positive and significant association with World Bank lending share. Equally striking is the importance of UN voting; TAU_US enters positively and significantly in the regression. Table 10 presents results for the Bush Administration from 1989 to 1992 (260 observations). Perhaps reflecting the end of the Cold War, US_SHARE is insignificant (small and negative) while USCP_SH and TAU_US continue significant. USCN_SH is insignificant again in line with diminished U.S. concerns about LDC debt.
VI. Conclusion
Estimations motivated by a model of U.S.-World Bank bargaining produce results that appear to indicate significant U.S. influence over World Bank lending but through evolving rather than stable relationships. U.S. interests in and policy toward the World Bank change frequently with changing presidential administrations. During the Johnson administration, the World Bank lending allocation appears relatively free of U.S. influence with lending allocations closely mirroring the highly acclaimed bilateral aid programs of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The only empirical link to U.S. interests during this period is through UN voting affinities and here the significance is weak. The Nixon Administration marks the beginning of significant U.S. influence with World Bank lending patterns more closely following U.S. interests as measured by the distribution of U.S. bilateral aid and U.S. commercial financial flows. The weak link with UN voting affinity persists. These patterns strengthen somewhat in the Carter Administration with the except that the link between UN voting and World Bank lending disappears. In the first Reagan administration, World Bank lending is biased in favor countries experiencing large U.S. commercial financial flows (in or out of the country) while at the same time World Bank lending follows U.S. bilateral aid allocations more closely. The reevaluation of multilateral lending during the second Reagan administration results in partial reversals with World Bank and U.S. commercial financial flows acting as complements and UN voting affinity playing a significant role. More radical changes in the Bush administration may signal the impact of the end of the Cold War. The U.S. no longer uses multilateral aid to pursue the same goals as bilateral aid though commercial objectives are still apparent.
It is easy to prove a stronger condition that the core lies in the portion of the lens above the The proofs below uses the same notation as in figure 1.
Proposition 1:
The no-bargaining Nash Equilibrium is B=x +y and s=½.
I I
Proof: For any fixed budget B (a budget line with slope=!1), the agency's symmetric preferences imply equal shares for countries x and y, i.e., s=½. Taking s=½ as given, the donor maximizes its objective function f subject to the constraints B=x+y and x=y. Applying elementary calculus or geometry yields B=(x +y ). point. In general, s denotes the value of s at point K (i.e., s =y /(x +y )) as well as the ray from the
origin through point K (which has slope=s ).
K Lemma 1:
The entire core lies above the line s=½ and below the line s=s , a subset of the above region.
I Proof: Proposition 2 shows that the entire core has s>½, i.e., (Mg/Mx)/(Mg/My)>1. Since (Mf/Mx)/(Mf/My)>1 only below the line parallel to s=½ through I, the core must lie in the portion of the lens below this line and above the line s=½. This region is a subset of the lens above the line s=½ and below the line s=s so the weaker condition stated in the lemma is proven.
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We can easily rule out of the core points on or below y=y . See previous footnote.
I
The path described is nonlinear since the intersection point shifts not only to flatter rays from 31 the origin but also to steeper rays from the donor's ideal point: M s/Má <0. Proof: The form of the utility functions yields constant agency indifference curve slopes along rays from the origin and constant donor indifference curve slopes along rays from the ideal point. The slope of an agency indifference curve is directly related to the slope of the ray from the origin while the slope of the donor indifference curve is inversely related to the slope of the ray from the ideal point (in the relevant range). Lemma 1 shows that all rays from the origin to points in the core will fall below the donor's ideal point I. Thus, for any point in the core C , the ray s from the origin will be steeper than the ray 0 C0
r from the donor's ideal point.
C0 30
Consider a second point in the core C that the agency prefers less than C , i.e., it is strictly to the 1 0 "southwest" of the original point. The rays from the origin and the donor's ideal point are not co-linear so at least one must differ from the previous case to have an intersection at C . Since the slopes of the 1 agency and donor indifference curves must be equal at C yet change in opposite directions relative to 1 the slopes of the two rays, the only consistent change in the rays is to have s steeper than s and r C1 C0 C1
less steep than r The other combination, less steep s , steeper r , yields an intersection strictly to
the "northeast" of C , i.e., one preferred by the agency. 0 This proves that s, the share to country y, increases monotonically as we move along the core from the agency's preferred point to the donor's preferred point, i.e., s increases montonically as á increases from the agency's preferred point in the core (á=0) to the donor's preferred point in the core (á=1): Ms/Má>0..
Proposition 4:
The degree of donor bias influences allocation: Ms/Ms >0.
I
Proof: Given the bargaining structure, it is sufficient to show that an increase in s will increase s at both I endpoints of the core (D and A). Any change in I can be decomposed into a movement along the original budget line to the new value of s and then a movement along a ray from the origin out to the final point preserving that value of s. The second step (increasing the sum x +y without changing s) has
This follows because it is simple scaling up. We could reproduce the original graph by 32 changing units appropriately. Although the values of x and y for the various tangencies, etc., would change, the ratio y/x and the share s=y/(x+y) would not since both dimensions are multiplied by the same scaling factor.
It is easy to show that y /x increases less than y /x .
D D I I
Note that these indifference curves cross Line s at two points; the discussion pertains to the 34 A1 relevant crossing, i.e., the one further from the origin.
Recall that these slopes are all negative. The second step, the proof for the agency's preferred point in the core (A), is more complex since we move to a new indifference curve for the agency. First define Line s , the line from the origin greater than the slope of f at point A and hence greater than the slope of g along Line s .
Thus, the tangency between g and f (i.e., point A ) occurs below Line s and s >s . Eggleston (1987) , Frey and Schneider (1986) , Gounder (1994) , Katada (1997) , Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) , Shishido and Minato (1994), and Trumbull and Wall (1994) ,
Other papers examining aid in terms of shares include Eggleston (1987) and Gang and 37 Lehman (1990).
Include in empirical section:
C Like Frey and Schneider, we make use of panel estimation methods.
36
C Following naturally from the theoretical model, our dependent variable is expressed in terms of shares.
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